Multiple studies have shown that high-deductible health plans lower spending levels, however, less is known about whether such plans have an effect on spending growth. We begin with a model of the relationship between levels of insurance coverage and both spending levels and spending growth, highlighting the role of new technology adoption in the latter. Next, we leverage cross-sectional variation in private deductibles across states (and over time) to estimate whether areas with relatively higher deductibles experience lower spending growth. We use publicly available data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality from 2002-2016, a period during which deductibles among privately insured employees more than tripled in magnitude and real spending growth exceeded 40%. Consistent with prior empirical work, we find that current period spending growth is significantly lower in states with higher deductible levels but non-responsive to changes in such levels over time. We observe these relationships in models of both private and total spending (including that on behalf of publicly insured and uninsured individuals), suggestive of potential spillovers. Future work should explore the role of other plan benefit characteristics in explaining spending growth and mechanisms underlying any observed effects.
Introduction
Many empirical studies of health insurance establish that, when an individual or a population moves from a private health plan with moderate cost sharing to one with a high deductible, spending falls, compared to what would have happened had people remained in the original plan. This reduction in spending has been tracked over at most one or two additional years.
However, evidence on what happens to spending growth rates for populations with longerterm persistence of high cost sharing plans is scant. No one knows whether such insurance can bend the cost curve for an extended period. If we assume that a major reason for growth in spending per capita over time is not demographic change but rather is the adoption and diffusion of more beneficial but more costly technologies, the potential impact of insurance coverage on that choice is of primary interest.
This long-term spending growth question has only been explored using the time series of national aggregated data, comparing growth in national health expenditures (NHE) or personal health expenditures (PHE) to the level of out of pocket spending (across public and private insurance) (Newhouse 1978 (Newhouse , 1988 (Newhouse , 1992 (Newhouse , 1993 Peden and Freeland, 1998) . Not only do these older analyses concern forms of cost sharing that have been eclipsed by others (namely, the federally-regulated high deductible health plan [HDHP] that can be linked to a tax shielded spending account), the necessarily small number of observations with nationally aggregated data and likely changing environmental characteristics in a time series limit the power of such analyses.
In this paper, we leverage cross-sectional variation across states (as well as over time) in the proportion of privately insured people covered by plans with high deductibles. We relate that variation to the growth of total spending (across the entire population), thus capturing any spillover effects of changes in plan generosity for a large segment of the population on spending growth for the entire population. We also focus on the direct effect of private insur-ance deductibles on privately insured spending growth, to provide an estimate of spending and private premium growth reduction linked to high deductible plans.
We find that current period medical spending growth, both over all persons and for the privately insured, is significantly lower in states with higher deductible levels than in those with lower levels. In contrast, as in Peden and Freeland (1998;  henceforth PF), we do not find a significant negative effect of changes in deductibles on contemporaneous spending growth.
These findings are robust despite the absence of a positive correlation between the level of high-deductible insurance penetration and the rate of growth in that penetration, and the lack of a correlation between the level of spending and the rate of growth of spending.
Conceptual Issues

Coverage Levels and Spending Levels
It is well established that, at the individual-or insurance plan-level, raising out of pocket (OOP) payments (by increasing an annual deductible) will lower spending levels for a time period or two after the change, relative to what they were before the change. In empirical studies, a high deductible treatment group is typically compared to a (usually low deductible) control group that experienced no change in cost sharing provisions in their insurance plan (for a recent example, see Haviland et al., 2016) .
This finding of lower levels of spending after switching to a HDHP is consistent with the standard theory of moral hazard: the higher average user price reduces the quantity demanded (Pauly, 1968) . This prediction and this analysis are simplest under the assumption that the set of services available (the technology) is unchanged from period to period. To see this, consider the following example.
Suppose that the initial distribution of medical expenses, x, in the population has the density f (x), and both consumers and actuaries believe that the distribution in the following period will remain the same. In other words, any change in coverage does not change spending in any state of health (there is no moral hazard). The actuarial value (AV) of benefits under an initial deductible, e.g. $500, takes the form:
It follows that the actuarially fair premium is as shown below, where λ is a positive proportional loading cost:
If the deductible were to increase to $2500 and there is no moral hazard, the AV expression becomes:
If there is no moral hazard, the expected OOP payments for a consumer with medical expenses x remains the lesser of $500 and x for x up to $500, increases to the lesser of $2500 and x for x between $500 and $2500, and increases from $500 to $2500 for x in excess of $2500. If there is a moral hazard response to the coverage change, there should be no change in spending for the first range just described, but the value of x and the expected benefits and OOP payments will decline for at least some values of x above $500. Thus, a test of the moral hazard hypothesis is whether the expected benefits (or premiums) fall by more than the decline in AV that would be expected with the original distribution of spending, f (x).
Coverage Levels and Spending Growth
Note that the theory above is a static theory: it does not consider changes in either unit prices or products over time. Such evidence as we have on spending growth in the US and in all other countries is consistent with the accounting identity-that it is composed of changes in unit prices and changes in quantity. However, the primary component of change in quantity comes from the introduction and use of new technologies, not from changes in volumes per capita of existing services using current technology (Weisbrod, 1991; Chandra and Skinner, 2012) . The impacts of demographic changes on quantity are small, while per capita rates of use of specific existing services ebb and flow, but on average change little (Papanicolas et al., 2018) . It is also important to note that technology itself is not wholly exogenous and may be endogenous to income growth, changes in tastes, changes in insurance, or prices.
Hence, any relationship of insurance coverage levels to spending growth depends on whether the level of coverage affects the adoption and utilization rates of new technology, and the rate of growth in unit prices. On the former point, it is plausible (but so far unproven) that higher cost sharing (compared to lower) will deter the rate of use of new and beneficial but (incrementally) costly new technologies, the extent depending on the level and distribution of value-added by that technology. It is less clear whether there should be an insurance relationship with growth of unit prices because it is unclear what causes prices to increase.
Monopoly power causes price levels to be high relative to perfect competition, but not to increase; price increases require increasing monopolization or some change in marginal cost of production (in excess of economy wide inflation). It is also plausible that higher cost sharing (compared to lower) will increase the average consumer's demand elasticity and thus deter price increases in response to increases in marginal cost, but in a study of one high deductible plan, Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) found no evidence of increased price shopping.
To reiterate, a higher demand elasticity alone will only mean that price levels are lowered when elasticity changes, not that they increase less rapidly.
Treating the increase in availability of new technology as both exogenous and constant over time, we can then predict in the aggregate time series that spending growth should be lower with higher levels of cost sharing (e.g. higher deductibles). Note that in this example it is the absolute amount of change rather than the percentage rate of change that is assumed to be affected. We could also add, as many have, that there should be feedback from lower demand to lower investment in new technology. However, with state cross section data, it is most reasonable to assume that access to any new technology will be roughly similar across states and any reduction in coverage in a given state will have a negligible effect on that access -any provider in any state can buy or order the latest piece of equipment or new drug.
One unknown, however, is whether new technology is made available nationwide (or worldwide) at a constant amount or rate per year. Probably there is variation in the rate of introduction -we certainly know that is true for the number of new drugs FDA approved each year -but beyond random fluctuation there is no developed model of the determinants of supply of new technology. Since the assumption of nationally uniform availability of technology implies that there should be no cross-state differences in spending growth related to innovation, we cannot test the hypothesis that technology influences spending growth in the cross section, and we have few years for a national aggregate time series.
One way to think about these kinds of effects of changes in cost sharing is to imagine that they raise the user price of existing services rendered using old technology and would imply a decrease in spending even if no new technology was supplied. That is, the level of deductible affects the rate of addition or diffusion of new technology, while the change in deductible (conditional on the starting level) reflects reductions in spending on old technology.
Methods
Data and Measures
The advent of high deductibles has been primarily limited to employment-based group insurance, though the Bronze and Silver exchange plans often require high dollar amounts to be paid up front. However, the most accurate state-level data on spending (and its growth rate) reflect spending financed from all sources. For those with group insurance, there is instead data on the amount of benefits paid per insured person per year. We will show that these data can be used to provide estimates of the growth in group insured spending. However, our baseline empirical model is one that uses growth in total spending per person in a state (including those with public, other private coverage, and no coverage) as the dependent variable, and looks for a relationship with group insurance deductibles and other factors.
Since private group insurance covers more than half of all Americans, we might expect to find some relationship.
For this spending data, we rely on the State Health Expenditure Accounts (SHEA), an extension of the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA), which are maintained by the US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and considered to be the official estimates of total health care spending in the country. The SHEA are estimated at the "Personal Health Care (PHC)" level and capture the consumption of all health care goods and services in all states across the country. Administrative costs associated with insurance provision, public health activities, and health investment funds are excluded. The SHEA estimates of PHC spending are available by payer (all-source, Medicare, Medicaid, private) and by disaggregated service categories (e.g. hospital care, prescription drugs).
The 1991-2014 SHEA are publicly available and can be found online along with detailed documentation of the methodology behind the data. Of note, private health insurance (PHI) expenditures in the SHEA are derived from information on premium payments, where net cost ratios 1 are applied to derive PHI spending (or benefits). That is, the SHEA contain a measure of benefits paid by private insurers for spending on insured services but no separate measure of the insured's out of pocket spending on those services and hence no measure of total spending on privately insured services nor its rate of change. For the purposes of this study, we utilized the 2002-2014 SHEA; summary statistics for select spending measures are provided in Table 1 , including both total spending and spending per capita/enrollee. With the exception of Medicaid spending per capita, all spending measures increased considerably over the data window, with the greatest growth observed in private spending. 
Regression Model
To derive an empirical regression equation to estimate based on the above model, we first posit that health spending in state i in year t is equal to the sum of spending on old and new technology. Formally, let "old" technology be technology introduced prior to the data window (i.e. before t = 1) and let "new" technology refer to technology introduced within the data window:
Next, we specify spending on old technology to be equal to a constant plus an additional amount that depends linearly on the deductible in state i in year t, denoted d it :
We hypothesize that a state's spending on new technology introduced in period t is equal to a fraction θ it of the constant per-period amount of new technology available, F . We further hypothesize that this fraction adopted is a function of the state's average deductible in that year. It follows that a state's spending on new technology introduced since t = 1 can be expressed as:
Together, Equations (1) and (2) imply the following equation for spending levels:
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that Figure 1 (and the accompanying discussion) considers "new" technology to be exclusively that introduced in the current period, while "existing" technology is any technology introduced prior to the current period. We can easily re-express Equation (3) to be consistent with this terminology:
Returning to the derivation of our estimating equation, we difference Equation (3) to obtain:
Next, consider the following specification for θ it , where δ is sufficiently small to ensure θ it ∈ [0, 1]:
Substituting the above expression for γ it into equation (3):
The final equation above is our preliminary estimating equation, where α = F and δ = δ ·F .
Accounting for other possible time-varying influences on spending (vector Z) and an econometric error yields the complete estimating equation:
In our models, we operationalize ∆x it as the change in a spending category or in private group insurance premiums since the previous year, measured as either a percent or dollar change. Spending categories include different payers (privately insured, all payers) as well as different service types (e.g. hospital, drug), and we consider both aggregate and per capita spending. As overall spending should respond to changes in OOP payment from public plans, largely driven by growth in Medicaid coverage and corresponding reductions in the uninsured rate, we include as controls both the level and the change in the state's proportion with Medicaid and proportion uninsured. We do not include as controls measures corresponding to influences that are uniform nationwide such as NIH spending or Medicare coverage and reimbursement.
In all models we utilize robust standard errors clustered by state to account for potential heteroscedasticity and intra-state correlations over time. 
All-Source Spending Growth
We begin with an analysis intended to replicate the PF model in Table 3 . In Columns 1-5, we relate deductible levels and changes in deductibles in private insurance to changes in spending per capita over all payers, in the spirit of PF. We find a significant negative effect of the level of that deductible on overall spending, but a positive or insignificant sign on the change in deductible using both absolute dollar changes and percentage changes (Columns 1 and 2, respectively). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the most significant effects of higher private deductibles is on the rate of growth in spending on costly new technology but that deductibles have no significant effects on spending on services based on existing technology. Given the qualitatively similar results, we employ percentage changes for all other models in the table.
We add the Medicaid and uninsured controls to the regression in Column 3. We find both the change in the proportion of the population with Medicaid and (anomalously) the change in the proportion uninsured to be associated with greater spending growth. Conversely, greater Medicaid enrollment is associated with lower spending growth. Medicare enrollment (and its change) was not significant, nor did it affect other coefficients, so is not included in these regressions. We retain these additional insurance controls for the remaining models in the table.
Columns 4 and 5 disaggregate growth in total spending into hospital and drug spending, respectively. The level of deductibles slows drug spending to a much greater extent than hospital spending (where it is negative but non-significant), consistent with the hypothesis that new technology is both more prevalent and more subject to consumer incentives in the former. We also consider the relationship between private plan deductibles and growth in aggregate spending in public (non-private) plans in Column 6. Here we find evidence of a significant spillover from high levels of private deductibles to public spending growth, and also an effect of the uninsured level, Medicaid level and Medicaid growth.
In summary, the main takeaway from Table 3 is that the explanatory variable with a consistent and significant association with lower overall state spending growth is the (log of) the average level of deductible among those with group insurance in the state. The change in the average deductible and the change in the proportion uninsured do not appear to signifi-cantly reduce spending growth. The absence of a significant negative effect for the change in coverage generosity (as measured by deductibles), controlling for the level of that coverage, is the same result as was found by PF.
Premiums and Benefits per Capita for those with Private Group Insurance
If we consider the effect of instituting a deductible or increasing an existing deductible, the change will lower expected benefits if the mean and distribution of insured spending remains constant; in other words, a higher deductible will lower the actuarial value of coverage all else equal. If per capita premiums bear a proportional relationship to per capita benefits, those reductions in the actuarial value of benefits should translate into proportional reductions in premiums. However, if an increase in deductibles reduces moral hazard applied to old or existing technologies, for which a portion of spending falls above the deductible, the level of total spending will fall. In this case, the fall in premiums should be greater than the fall in the actuarial value of benefits.
The results of regressions relating changes in premiums per person (from the MEPS IC)
to the levels and changes in unconditional deductibles are shown in the first four columns of Table 4 . The first two columns use percent changes in premiums and deductibles while the second two columns use dollar changes. Columns 1 and 3 show the change in the unconditional deductible, and Columns 2 and 4 show the result of breaking that variable into its component parts, the change in proportion with a positive deductible and the change in deductible conditional of having an initial positive deductible. In all four columns, the level of the deductible is highly significant. When the deductible changes, all four models indicate a negative impact on premiums, though only the models with changes expressed in dollars achieve statistical significance. 4 However, the coefficient on the change in conditional deductible (in either specification) is not large enough relative to the change in actuarial value of benefits to indicate a moral hazard effect on current technology spending at the levels of deductible that commonly prevailed.
The final two columns of Table 4 show analogous results with estimated percent changes in private spending per capita (from the SHEA data) as the dependent variable. Recall that this measure is estimated from data on PHI premiums (and assumptions about insurer markups and coverage) and is not based on the same sample underlying the MEPS-based measures of deductibles and premiums. This measure still displays a significant coefficient on the unconditional level of deductibles, but now the contemporaneous change in deductibles is not significant regardless of how it is measured. We also explored using a measure of change in actuarial value based on a distribution of spending observed in a single year of the MEPS HC (instead of the change in deductible) and explored adding multiple lags of the change in deductible (results not shown). In both cases, we found no evidence of impact.
Discussion
These results strongly confirm the main PF hypothesis -that high levels of cost sharing (in this case in the form of deductibles) are associated with lower rates of growth of spending.
This finding is an interesting combination of the static and dynamic behavior, in that the level of one variable affects the rate of change of anotherbut that is what our model of new and old technology implies. In contrast, the change in cost sharing as measured by the change in deductible levels does not have a significant effect on total spending or on spending by group insureds. However, it does sometimes have the expected significant negative effect on the growth of private insurance benefits, but the small magnitude of the change is consistent with a hypothesis of no significant effect on spending on old technology.
Given that the annual changes in deductibles were relatively modest during this period (about 11% per year on a base of about $1120), it is perhaps not surprising that we did not find a statistically significant effect for those changes, consistent with the view of both PF and Chernew and Newhouse (2011) . Moreover, the RAND experiment had shown that the bulk of the negative effects of deductibles on spending arise from moving from zero deductible to relatively small positive deductibles, again not surprising because at higher deductible levels, any increase in that level affects a smaller and smaller fraction of total spending (that above the previous deductible).
Our results could also be due to other causes. If there are statewide differences in the rate of adoption of high deductible plans related to statewide differences in responsiveness to coverage, there could be "(adverse) selection on moral hazard" (Einav et al., 2013) . If so, the absence of a response to changes over time in deductibles would imply that less responsive (to cost-sharing) individuals were moving to higher deductible plans, which may or may not be a plausible story. Finally, it is possible that other types of changes in plan generosity, such as increases in copayments and coinsurance rates, might have a larger or stronger effect on the growth in spending. 5 Future work should explore these relationships further, including other features of plan benefit design, such as cost-sharing arrangements for specific services. Additionally includes other non-durable medical products
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